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During the last one hundred years, the lands of the Czech crown have several times
undergone significant political turmoil. The extent to which these periods have been
analyzed differs, but for no area is there still a larger gap in the literature than for
the socialist period between 1948 and 1989. This is a huge missed opportunity to
learn from recent history. Furthermore, in analyzing this period it is hard to find a
more overlooked field than the educational policy of the socialist governments, as can
be illustrated by the following excerpt from the comprehensive Czech publication in
the field of pedagogy, the Encyclopedia of Pedagogy:
“The current Czech educational historiography deals with the educa-
tional system before 1938 and earlier, but avoids evaluating education
under the socialist rule. (...) The lack of an impartial scientific eval-
uation of the state and quality of the socialist education between 1948
and 1989 today often results (most significantly in the media) in only its
black and white presentation.” (Průcha, 2009)
This is understandable. Yet, as the lessons that can be learned are potentially of
huge value for current policy decisions, I think more attention is needed.
In my work, I would like to address this deficiency, and by examining the impact
of reforms in educational policies evaluate, what inference we can make concerning
present policies. The reforms in question are the changes in length of primary and
secondary education from eight to nine years (and vice versa)1, which occurred
several times during the socialist period.
The reasons for choosing this question as the topic of my thesis are twofold. The
first reason is that it is an evergreen topic in the Czech educational policy debate.
It is in the back of people’s mind, policy makers and the general public alike, and
then surfaces every now and then in the media. Most recently it was proposed as
an anti-crisis measure by one of the advisors to the Czech Minister of Education.
From the media, it is easy to get the impression that the debate lacks a certain
degree of empirical, or quantitative, background, and it seems that this is not just
an impression. While this work does by no means offer a clear answer to the question
of what impact the extra year of education had, it does try to provide some of the
above mentioned background important for the debate.
The qualitative discussion on the length of education has a great number of as-
pects. For illustration and context, I shall mention a few. From the pedagogical
1Because of terminological variability(Průcha, 1999, p. 67-68) it is useful to note that when
referring to “primary and secondary education” in this text I mean primary and lower secondary
education, i.e. the education taking part between the sixth and 14th or 15th year of age.
According to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) these are the
levels ISCED 1 and ISCED 2A(Kalous, 2006, p. 18).
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point of view the main topic is the impact another year has on the child’s devel-
opment - knowledge-wise and in psychological terms. Part of the discussion in this
context is also how old the child should be before it is able to decide on the future
course of its life, including choice of high school. From the financial perspective,
the question is how much money can be saved by shortening education. Very rough
estimates in the media talk about a reduction in number of students at one moment
by up to 1/14 which would mean annual savings of several billion korunas. This is
the idea behind the reduced length of education as an anti-crisis measure. From the
social perspective this question is related to the current trends of child misbehavior.
The growing age in which children are in school (combined with the current pop-
ular yearly delay in entering school) also leads to the issues of legal sex for pupils
in lower secondary schools and legal alcohol consumption and driving during high
school. Possible implication for other areas of life of the society, such as the impact
on fertility, are also intriguing.
It must be noted that the lack of empirical grounding which manifests itself in
public debate, while partially present in the academic sphere, does definitely not
hold there. It seems, that estimating the impact of returns to different lengths of
education is a topic which is not being given too much attention in the science of
pedagogy (Průcha, 1999, p. 72), but in the field of educational economics (to which
this thesis belongs, dealing with the financial returns to education) there exists a
body of research addressing it. This is the second reason I chose this topic.
Estimation of returns to education is a classical topic of educational economics.
Methodologically, various approaches and datasets have been used to try to estimate
it, and with my thesis I add another item to this collection. My approach falls into
the methodological group of natural experiments. According to Leigh and Ryan
(Leigh and Ryan, 2008) we can further divide these approaches broadly into three
categories. Either we use month of birth as an instrumental variable for education,
utilizing its discontinuity on the basis of local legislation concerning mandatory
schooling duration, or we make use of a change in educational laws which creates a
discontinuity for the cohorts before and after the change, or we can have a sample
consisting of identical twins. My work falls into the second category. By comparing
data on cohorts, which were not hit by the reforms, and those which were hit, I
can quantify the effects of the above mentioned reforms. The variable I evaluate
was chosen because of its availability in the data, and the established relationship
with expected general educational goals. Other possible promising approaches are
mentioned in the Conclusion.
It is not necessary to stress, that investments into education are a very important
policy topic. The 2011 budget of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports
of the Czech Republic represents (at approximately 127 billion Korunas) almost
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eleven percent of the entire Czech state budget. Furthermore, based on the size
of the Czech Republic and its lack of natural resources combined with its history
of quality education it would seem that investing into human capital as our main
asset is a natural course of action. Czech Republic as a “knowledge economy”
is a frequent political catchphrase. However, attaining top educational results in
international competition is getting more difficult by the day, the crisis of public
funds in the developed world means that budgets are tight, and so knowing where
the state gets the most “bang for the buck” from its investments into education is
absolutely crucial.
It must also be noted that it is hard to be inspired by international examples,
as the situation differs from country to country. The countries with eight years
of primary and lower secondary education include Austria, Belgium, Hungary, and
Italy, those with nine France, Ireland, Sweden, and Poland, and then there are also
countries with ten years of education, for instance Germany and Denmark(Eurydice,
2010).
The structure of the thesis is as follows: chapter two offers a brief introduction
to the returns to education literature, as education economics is not a classical field
of economics taught in mandatory courses, and thus prior knowledge of the field by
all readers cannot be assumed, chapter three deals with the historical background
concerning changes in educational laws, chapter four describes the datasets used
(EU-SILC and Structure of Earning Survey), in chapter five the various regressions
and methods used are explained, chapter six discussed the results and their impli-
cations, chapter seven concludes.
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2 Returns to Education Literature
2.1 Concepts
In my thesis I use several concepts well established in Educational Economics lit-
erature, in this section I would like to briefly introduce them. I draw from sev-
eral Educational Economics schoolbooks, articles from the Economics of Education
Review, and other papers, including the excellent literature overview concerning
returns to education by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) for the World Bank,
more specifically on his latest review paper written jointly with Patrino.
Firstly, it is important to set the economic context in which my research is taking
place. When discussing the types of public investments into education, they can
be divided into two broad categories: investments aiming at changing the quality
of education, and those aiming at changing its quantity. According to Fitzpatrick
et al. (2011) more attention has historically been given in educational research to the
qualitative aspects of investing into education (quality of teachers, size of class, etc.),
than to the quantitative aspects (duration of school year, number of school years).
However, in the same article they also state that this trend has been changing lately.
The educational economics concept at which I begin my analytical journey is the
attempt to estimate the differences in returns to a year of education between cohorts
with different lengths of primary and secondary school using the Mincer function,
the exact form of which is described later in the chapter Methodology. It is a well
established function often used for estimating the returns to education, most often
used on cross-sectional data. It is based on the papers Human Capital: A Theo-
retical and Empirical Analysis by Gary Stanley Becker from 1964, who introduced
the concept of internal rate of return to education, and Schooling, Experience and
Earnings by Jacob Mincer from 1974 (Hanushek, 2006, p.311). The following ex-
cerpt from the Handbook of the Economics of Education gives a good idea of its
usage:
[The Mincer] model is widely used as a vehicle for estimating “returns”
to schooling quality, for measuring the impact of work experience on
male–female wage gaps, and as a basis for economic studies of returns
to education in developing countries. It has been estimated using data
from a variety of countries and time periods. Recent studies in growth
economics use the Mincer model to analyze the relationship between
growth and average schooling levels across countries. (Hanushek, 2006,
p. 311)
It is important to note that since its creation, drawbacks of the Mincer function have
appeared, as discussed extensively in the above mentioned Handbook. However,
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these problems are related to the interpretation of the coefficient in the Mincer
equation as rate of return to investment into education (Hanushek, 2006, p. 350).
As my goal is not to asses the specific financial returns to an investment in the
examined periods, but to describe the direction in which these returns shift if we
change the length of education, I have a simpler task. I do not have to deal with
the topics of hard to measure psychic costs of schooling, impact of taxes, length of
life, etc., but rather I compare the differences in the “returns” for individual ways in
which primary and secondary education can be organized, and for this the Mincer
function is sufficient. Its limitations are not relevant to my thesis. With the danger
of oversimplification I could say that I use the returns to education as an “index”
of the results that the setting of the educational system has on its pupil, which
is consistent with the interpretation of the returns as the “growth rate of market
earnings with years of schooling” (Hanushek, 2006, p. 311).
Concerning the general trends, which apply for the rate of return, Psacharopoulos
states in his overview that “the pattern of falling returns to education by level of
economic development and level of education are maintained”, and he also com-
putes that the average rate of return for another year of completed education is
approximately 10% for the world, 7.5% for OECD (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos,
2004). For the Czech Republic in 1996 the return for an extra year was 5.8% for
males and growing rapidly, according to Munich et al. (2005). It is also useful to
look at the returns per level of education, specifically the equivalent to the Czech
“základní škola”, which is primary and lower secondary education. The total (social
and private) returns for primary and secondary education are 45.5% and 30.1% for
the World and 21.9% and 20.7% for OECD, respectively. My goal however, is to
look for changes in the returns to education rather than in their absolute values.
As a side note, it would be also possible to criticize the measurement of the returns
on education by stating that education during socialism has had no effect on earnings
during capitalism because of different skills needed in each period. However, in Filer
et al. (1999)we read, that
“Studies (summarized in [Švejnar, J., “Labor markets in the transitional
central and east European economies”, Handbook of Labor Economics,
Volume 3, Part 2, 1999, Pages 2809-2857, North Holland, Amsterdam] )
investigating changes in the value of education as communist countries
converted into market economies have typically found increases, espe-
cially among men.”
which does not agree with this hypothesis.
Another interpretation of the outcome of my work is to shed more light on the
so called “sheepskin effect” hypothesis, as discussed for instance by Hungerford and
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Solon. To use their phrasing, this hypothesis states that “wages will rise faster with
extra years of education when the extra year also conveys a certificate” (Hunger-
ford and Solon, 1987). (The fact that an elementary school certificate is a normal
certificate can be found for instance in Card (1999))
The testing of this hypothesis is a part of the discussion between the screening and
human capital theories, which disagree on what is the underlying reason for returns
to education. Screening theory, based on asymmetric information, states that the
extra return to education may not necessarily be from the change in the pupil’s
skills, but because of the screening function of education. The title is a symbol of
someone inherently capable, and so leads to higher income in later years, but the
person’s capability itself may have not changed.
In our case, because the title that basic school conveys does not change with the
changes in law, we are able to discern whether the predictions of the screening theory
of education (its the certificate that matters, no extra returns to education from an
extra year of schooling) are right, or if the human capital theory is right (extra year of
schooling enhances the pupil’s abilities, and thus increases the returns to education).
A further asset of the method used in this thesis is that it overcomes limitation in
interpretation that often occur in other designs, as explained in Hungerford and
Solon, which are caused by comparing dropouts and successful students, who may
have different inherent traits. Thus, while comparing dropouts and graduates limits
the interpretation of the sheepskin effect as supporting the screening theory, in my
work this is possible.
An interesting aspect of the screening vs. human capital theories is whether it
matters, and if yes, for whom. From the individual’s point of view it does not -
clearly, if you manage to get a higher education, you tend to make more money,
no matter the reason. However, from the societal welfare point of view the answer
is much less clear. As the question is put in Johnes (2004) “If [schooling’s] only
purpose is to sort prospective workers, then questions arise as to the appropriateness
of investing in the expansion and/or qualitative upgrading of schooling: does it really
need three years of undergraduate education to sort young adults effectively?”
2.2 Past Studies
Now I would like to comment on two approaches used in factual researches dealing
with the amount of time spent by students in school, and the impact this has on
their achievement, give several examples, and compare their results. Generally,
because of higher incidence, it is more common that differences in the amount of
time spent in school within a single year between different groups of students are
examined. For instance Fitzpatrick et al. (2011) is based on a different length of
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periods between taking the same tests among kindergarten children, Marcotte (2007)
uses the differences in the number of schooldays among individual schools caused by
snow calamities, and assess their impact throughout primary and lower secondary
school, Pischke (2003) estimates the results of changing lengths of school year during
1966 and 1997 in Western Germany, etc. These studies uniformly report positive
impact of a higher amount of educational time on educational achievement.
However, their topic is different from my thesis, and that is so for several reasons:
obviously the difference in magnitude (and resulting topics such as what is the role
of curricula, what is the role of the disturbed structure of education during a usual
school year), less obviously the changing returns to education with time. It is usually
assumed that the returns to education are homogenous throughout the educational
process (in cases where years of education are used), or at least implicitly per year
spent at the same educational institution (when they are represented by qualitative
variables).
This is a very simplifying assumption, and lifting it means that we are suddenly
severely limited in extrapolating the results from an “extra day” to an “extra year”.
Lifting this assumption makes sense however, because, taking into account the cur-
riculum, there is no reason why returns to learning to read or sum in the first grade
should be equal to learning to solve quadratic equations). This notion is also sup-
ported in Marcotte (2007), where one of the results is that “the performance of stu-
dents in lower grades was more affected by snowfall than students in higher grades”.
These types of studies do not directly answer my question, and it is necessary to
look at studies which are closer in nature.
The following studies have addressed the question of the impact of an extra year
of education. The first intriguing study is Oosterbeek and Webbink (2007a), which
examines the impact of a change in educational laws in the Netherlands in 1975,
which lengthened a portion of the basic vocational education from three to four
years, and had an impact on the 15 and 16 year olds. The main difference from
my thesis is that they do not estimate an extra year of education for whole cohorts,
but only for a part of the group that went to vocational schools (which is a more
partial information, but also allows for comparison between groups from the same
cohorts). They do not find any statistically significant improvement in average wage
as a result of the change. Another used approach is the combination of examining
mandatory education and some sort of discontinuity. Angrist and Krueger (1990)
utilize a discontinuity caused by the quarter of birth in the United States, Aakvik
et al. (2003) uses a change in mandatory education laws in Norway, and so does
Oreopoulos (2003), this time in Britain and Ireland.
All three of these studies find a substantial positive result of the lengthening of
mandatory education, and so I would not be afraid to conclude that the benefit
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of longer education for those who would have left school was it not for the law, is
well established. The contribution of my study is that I deal with the effect that
the changes have on the entire cohort. This is related on one hand to the issue
of heterogeneity of returns to schooling between individuals in the sample, but on
the other hand also means that my conclusions are of significantly higher policy
relevance.
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3 Overview of Chosen Socialist Educational Reforms
Educational reform in the former Czechoslovakia took place in the form of „edu-
cational laws“ („školský zákon“) which altered the institutional framework of the
Czech educational systems. The reformatory laws dealing with the length of school
enrollment took place in 1948, 1953, 1960, 1984, and, again after the Velvet Revo-
lution, in 1996. Furthermore, I will briefly discuss the reform of 1968, which ended
the six day school week. Two comments must be made concerning these reforms in
general.
Firstly (and regrettably) these laws dealt with the whole educational system, and
so the identification of the most important factor which resulted in the perceived
change is hindered. However, it can be expected that while many changes were
“subtle” and time was required for their implementation to take place after their
formal acceptance, the binary nature of the length of education means that the
impact was immediate. This is one of the assumptions on which I base that the
change in primary and secondary school enrollment was the main driving factor
in the reforms. The only other factor of similar binary nature was the change in
length of general compulsory education, which, as in most countries Průcha (1999,
p. 67-68), was tied to the length of primary and secondary education, as shown in
the table Time Periods and Basic / Mandatory Education.
Secondly, the laws themselves were not always executed at once over the whole
Czechoslovakia or Czech Republic. In some cases the schools could close the extra
class already before the law came into effect. The extent to which the socialist bu-
reaucracy complied is illustrated by table Number of Pupils in Ninth Grade around
the Cutoff Years. This means that my study is not free of noise in the data, making
quantitative analysis more difficult. However, that is the burden of a social scientist,
and the degree of the noise can be estimated from the changes in numbers of stu-
dents in the ninth grade. Furthermore, this means that if we are able to discern an
effect on the current standing of the cohorts even though the reforms are somewhat
diluted, our conclusion is not endangered. If we are not able to find an effect, further
discussion is necessary.
The laws in question were the following
• Law no. 95/1948 of the Code, implemented nine year primary and secondary
education.
• Law no. 31/1953 of the Code, implemented eight year primary and secondary
education.
• Law no. 186 / 1960 of the Code, implemented nine year primary and secondary
education.
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• Law no. 29/1984 of the Code, implemented eight year primary and secondary
education.
• Law no. 258/1996 of the Code, implemented nine year primary and secondary
education.
The following table summarizes these laws and compares them to the length of
mandatory education:
Table 1: Time Periods and Basic / Mandatory Education




8 9 8 9 8 8 9
Years of mandatory
education
8 9 8 9 10 9 9
As we can see, because primary and secondary education was considered as the
mandatory level, the development of the mandatory number of years closely follows
- except for one period - the development in the first table. This means that any
effect we discern “per cohort” consists of both of these effects. However, when we
compare the magnitude of each (by comparing the number of people who finish
their education just after completing lower secondary education and the rest of the
population) we see that the effect of an extra year of education is much larger.
To be specific, in the SILC data, an extra year of education influences more than
99.5% of the population, while the change in mandatory education at most 15% (the
number of people in the sample who have completed lower secondary education as
their highest level). Based on this I assume that the effect I measure was caused
more by a global change in the length of primary and secondary education than
in its mandatory length. Nevertheless, these numbers do not allow us to definitely
identify the cause of the effect, and this must be kept in mind when interpreting the
results.
I think it is a good idea to document the extent to which the change was imme-
diate and significant. I do this by examining the data from the Statistical Yearbook
of Czechoslovakia and the Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic2 for the re-
spective years, skipping the first two changes in the law in 1948 and 1953, because
between 1949 and 1956 the Statistical Yearbooks were not published. The table
shows the number of pupils who went to ninth grade in a given year (1996 stands
for the school year 1996/1997). In years when the ninth grade was implemented
2Specifically, the Statistical Yearbook of Czechoslovakia for 1960, 1963, 1965, 1981, 1984, 1987,
1990 and the Statistical Yearbook of the Czech Republic for 1996, 2000, 2001.
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(1960, 1996) we expect to see a sharp increase, and on the other hand, when the
ninth grade was scrapped we would expect a rapid fall. We can see that the growth
is immediate and sharp, the fall is visible also, but a little more gradual - thus we
know that the implementation of the change was also more gradual. However, it
still a very significant number.
Table 2: Number of Pupils in Ninth Grade around the Cutoff Years
Year 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Number of pupils in ninth grade 0 0 0 40,408 113,380 205,868 208,849 202,398 185,158
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Number of pupils in ninth grade 101,469 64,043 22,581 5,016 0 0 0 0 0
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of pupils in ninth grade 30,570 20,270 10,183 5,811 112,689 108,641 109,662 108,797 108,507
I think it is also worth mentioning that originally I planned to examined the im-
pact of the reduction in number of schooldays on the returns to a year of education.
As discussed in Returns to Education Literature there is a significant body of liter-
ature indicating that the effect would be possible to find and significantly positive.
However, the change in the length of the school week did not take place at once.
As it was a part of the endeavor for a shorter school year, it came in waves, as
the political situation changed in favor of it. Firstly, starting in 1964 every fourth
Saturday was without school, then from 1966 every second one, and finally from
1968 it was abolished altogether. The possibility of finding any effect as a result
of this gradual implementation is then totally undermined by the events of 1968,
which caused serious change all over the society, and much less importantly the
discretionary implementation in individual regions. For these reasons I omitted the




The main dataset I shall work with is the Czech EU-SILC (Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions) from 2006 to 2009 (before 2006 individual income, my ex-
planatory variable, was not reported). SILC is collected by Eurostat via the Czech
Statistical Office, and provides reliable data on household and individual income in
the Czech Republic. From these datasets I take those respondents, who were not
affected by the change in policy by a maximum of three years, and compare them
to the first three cohorts which were affected.
As is stated in the respective laws, mandatory enrollment takes place in the
September of the first school year after the child has attained six years of age,
and is followed by eight or nine years of education. Thus, for example when assess-
ing the impact of the 1953 policy, I compare the cohorts born between the beginning
of September 1935 and the end of August 1938, which experienced nine years of pri-
mary and lower secondary education, with the cohorts born between the beginning
of September 1938 and the end of August 1941, which experienced nine years of
primary and lower secondary education. As we can see, the middle of this group,
those born in September 1938, were those who were first to experience only eight
years of primary and secondary education. (Being born in September 1938, they
went to first grade on 1 September 1945, finished eighth grade in June 1953 and did
not go into ninth grade, because the law was already in effect. Those born just a
month earlier were not affected.)3
However, the SILC dataset does not provide the date of birth of its respondents,
but only their age. Since the SILC data collection, as stated in the documentation,
takes place approximately on the 1 May of each year, we must furthermore leave out
from our data those who are of age, not allowing us to recognize whether they were
affected by the change. For example, a person whose reported age on 1 May 2009
is 704 was born between 2 May 1938 and 1 May 1939, thus we cannot determine
whether or not he was affected. To overcome this, we leave out the middle year in
each case.
The cohorts we are interested in and amount of corresponding data provided are
summed up in tables Relevant Cohorts and Ages and Sample Size.
3An objection brought up (and refuted inMarcotte (2007)) in cases of mildly similar studies which
make use of monthly cutoff points for entering first grade is that parents may be taking this
into account when deciding when to have a child. This problem may be ignored in my study
as the time horizon makes any prediction impossible.
4When referring to a certain age in the data throughout the text, I calculate it in relation to
the SILC 2009 dataset, i.e. data collected around 1st of May 2009. When working with older
datasets I adjusted the ages accordingly, see below.
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Table 3: Relevant Cohorts and Ages
Date when law
came into effect




1.9.1948 Sep. 1930 - Aug. 1933 Sep. 1933 - Aug. 1936 78-72 75
7. 5. 1953 Sep. 1935 - Aug. 1938 Sep. 1938 - Aug. 1941 73-67 70
28. 12. 1960 Sep. 1943 - Aug. 1946 Sep. 1946 - Aug. 1949 65-59 62
1. 9. 1984 Sep. 1966 - Aug. 1969 Sep. 1969 - Aug. 1972 42-36 39
1. 9. 1996 Sep. 1978 - Aug. 1981 Sep. 1981 - Aug. 1984 30-24 27
The size of the data useful for regressions is the following:
Table 4: Sample Size
Age\ SILC Year 2009 2008 2007 2006 Total size by cohort
78-72 in 2009, excluding 75 1,216 1,401 1,181 851 4,649
73-67 in 2009, excluding 70 1,435 1,718 1,392 1,052 5,597
65-59 in 2009, excluding 62 2,157 2,437 1,935 1,470 7,999
42-36 in 2009, excluding 39 1,802 1,965 1,729 1,270 6,766
30-24 in 2009, excluding 27 1,628 1,979 1,778 1,368 6,753
When choosing the dependent variable from the SILC dataset I chose the indi-
vidual’s income. It must be noted that for a policy-relevant topic this is of course
a strongly reductionist approach. It would be very easy, and true, to object that I
ignore many results of education, in this context many parts of human capital, both
by choosing only this one variable, and by the pure fact that a large portion of the
outcomes of education are inherently unmeasurable. I fully acknowledge that. My
thesis is a partial view of the topic, which must necessarily be reductionist, if it is to
be empirical, and thus complement the otherwise prevailing qualitative approach to
the topic. I will not dive into the discussion of what are the relationships between
an empirical approach, a qualitative approach, the controversial noun “objectivity”,
and policy relevance, as that is discussed elsewhere. This is to establish, that the
offered viewpoint is only partial.
The table 5 is a list of chosen variables I took from the SILC dataset and the ones
I generated in the process of preparing the data for the regressions together with
their descriptions. From now on and throughout the thesis, I will use the Names of
the variables used in this table when I need to refer to them.
Information about what was done with the data can be found in detail in the .do
list of commands, which is available on request. Here I will try to briefly sum it
up. The mechanical data changes included renaming the variables, removing obser-
vations lacking Income, removing observations of individuals of other than Czech
and Slovak nationality, generating dummy variables from qualitative variables, and
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The net income per year in korunas
Education
(vzd)
The highest attained educational certificate. Starts at
0 (unfinished elementary school) and ends at 9
(Ph.D.). When relevant in the regressions i removed
less than 0,5% of the observations which were those
who did not complete even lower secondary education
EducYrs
(VZDROKY)
The number of years an individual spent in school. An
imputed variable, see discussion in text
Workedweekly
(odprac)
Number of working hours per week
Workedyrs
(odprac_let)













Age of respondent in 2009
LnIncome
(LNCPRIJMY)
The logarithm of annual net income. (For a discussion
why to use the log see Card (1999)) Used as variable
lnY in the Mincer function
LnHourlyIncome
(LNCPRIJMYHOUR)
≡ ln(cprijmy/odprac). The logarithm of the ratio of
annual wage and number of worked hours per week.
Thanks to the same number of workweeks across






The year of data collection
Prague
(PRAGUE)
Resident in Prague, a dummy variable
Case
(PRIPAD)
To which discontinuity the observation is related and
whether it preceded it or came after it. Starts at 1,
which are those between 24 and 26 of age, and ends at
10 which are those between 76 and 78.
For further information see table Age, Treatment and
Case
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separating the observations into individual groups (Case). However, then there are
two modifications of the data, which were more major and which require deeper
explanation.
The first problem is that for calculating the returns to a year of education it was
necessary to recode the variable Education from “highest attained certificate” to
“number of schooling years”, so that it could then be used as the first variable of
the classical Mincer equation. This is very problematic, but it can be defended on
three levels. First of all, the irregularities that this step causes can be expected
to be symmetrically split between the cohorts before and after the change, not
biasing the “per cohort” data in any direction. Furthermore, the magnitude of these
irregularities should not be too great. According to the EU Youth Report (2009)
the Czech Republic has a dramatically low number of dropouts, and even though
data is lacking, it seems that this is for historical reasons - the trend of very low
dropout rate was similar in the past. From this we can assume that the number
of students repeating years of education was low, and thus the fluctuations in this
low number might not have had a drastic effect on the data. Third, the Education
variable is reasonably well defined: it has 10 different levels of education most of
which can be assigned a definite number of years. However, the largest exception
to this, category three - lower vocational education, where it is unsure whether the
length of study is two or three years - includes the largest number of observations,
around 40 percent of them.
Second serious step I took was that I put together data from different SILC data
collections. In the process I created the variable age which shows the age of the
individual in year 2009. This step seems benign, but it does add an certain amount
of uncertainty. However, as is shown in section 5, the effect of this step is largely
predictable and does not seriously influence the educational estimates.
4.2 Structure of Earning Survey
Structure of Earnings Survey (SES) is a large data source that I have used to repli-
cate and complement the regressions tested on SILC. The Czech version of SES is
collected quarterly for the Czech Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs by TREX-
IMA, and contains data from businesses and the government on employee pay. For
my research it is useful that the data includes average hourly pay, and a number of
hours worked per quarter, the combination of which I use as the dependent variable.
As I did not have direct access to the data5 the regressions run will be practically the
same as for the SILC dataset. However, the size of the same dataset is significantly
higher, which allows for more precise estimates. On the other hand, the number of
5Remote access to a 1% sample of the 2005 Structure of Earning Survey (the Information system
on average earnings) was provided by Stepan Jurajda.
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years of work experience is unavailable, so only age was used. The dataset used was
from 2005.
Table 6: List of SES Variables
Variables Description
hwage average hourly wage
wagequart average quarterly wage (
age Age
age2 ≡age2
Education Vector of dummies for highest
attained education, starts at primary
end at Ph.D. level.




As has been explained in the section Overview of Chosen Socialist Educational
Reforms, we have several independent cases of prolonging and shortening education.
When trying to asses these, I would like to deal with each of them separately, which
means that I would be dealing with five independent cases. However, the situation
is not so simple. In Case 1&2 the individuals are still too young for proper income
data to be available. In case Case 5&6 the income data is not reliable, because
the retirement age comes into effect precisely at that time (differently for different
individuals depending on their number of children, information which is sadly not
included in the individual SILC dataset). And finally, in Case 7&8 and Case 9&10
the incomes are the pensions, so the differences are significantly smaller than in the
previous cases. It is true that pensions are income dependent, albeit weakly, so the
change should in theory be detectable, but finding them among the various noise
in the model makes the task quite hard. Furthermore, the case Case 9&10 deals
with individuals who “were” in primary and lower secondary school during (and
shortly after) World War II. Because of the chaos (Kalous, 2006, p. 18), which was
commonplace at the time in Czech schools, comparisons from that period are very
hard to make. As we see, our main case is primarily the Case 3&4 and secondarily
Case 7&8, i.e. the cohorts of those who were around 39 and those around 70 (±3
years) in 2009.
I will test two hypotheses, a stronger one and a weaker one, both concerning the
impact of policy changes on the returns to education. The stronger one is that
“Overall returns to an elementary school certificate do not change with a change
of length of basic school education”, the weaker one, “Returns to an extra year of
education grow after shortening basic school education.”
Unsurprisingly, the weaker hypothesis is implied by the stronger one. The aim
of the weaker hypotheses is to find out whether an additional year of schooling
has added less to the individual’s income than the previous years, and the aim of
the stronger one is to find out, if it had any effect at all, or if only the certificate
matters. The weaker hypothesis is more important for public investment decisions,
the stronger hypothesis is a variant of the above mentioned “sheepskin effect”, where
we find out the importance of a certificate in the returns to education.
However, there is still an interpretational problem with these hypotheses. This
is because I am actually testing simultaneously two unknown characteristics: the
sheepskin effect and the human capital impact of an extra year of education. Thus,
in the extreme case, if I find no beneficial effect of an extra year of education, I
do not know whether this is because the ninth year of education has no impact, or
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whether because in general no years of education have impact, as it is the certificate
that matters. This is further discussed in the section Results.
5.2 Regression discontinuity & The Mincer Function
I shall use a sharp regression discontinuity design to compare the individual traits
of the cohorts with and without the ninth grade. The basis for this method is taken
from Imbens and Lemieux (2008). As argued in the study, for the approach to
be applicable, it must be possible to describe all individual data available in the
form (Yi,Wi, Xi, Zi) where Yi is a certain outcome, Wi is a binary variable showing
whether a treatment was administered, and Xi, Zi are pretreatment variables. While
Zi is a matrix of covariates, Xi is a number. The crucial role here is played by the
variable Xi, the values of which determine Wi.
This notation holds for my data. The values Yi are the regression dependent
variables, i.e. Income, the variable Wi shows whether or not the individual received
a treatment in the form of a 9th grade of education. The determining variable Xi
is the age of the person (as the administration of the treatment is age dependent)
and Zi represents the remaining available data. The principle of the regression
discontinuity design lies in our expectation of a smooth relationships between Xi
and Yi. I examine, if this smooth relationships holds even in cases where there
might be a reason for it to not do so, i.e. I compare the relationships around the
ages where cutoff points occurred - theoretically 27, 39, 62, 70 and 75. Out of these,
we are interested mainly in those around 39 and those around 70. The historical
relationship between Xi and Wi, (including Case), is summed up in table Age,
Treatment and Case.
Table 7: Age, Treatment and Case
Xi <24,26> <28,30> <36,38> <40,42> <59,61>
Wi 1 0 0 1 1
Case 1 2 3 4 5
Xi <63,65> <67,69> <71,73> <72,74> <76,78>
Wi 0 0 1 1 0
Case 6 7 8 9 10
As the regression on which we measure the discontinuity we will use the human
capital earning function based on Mincer, introduced in the section Returns to
Education Literature and as taken from Ferrer and Riddell (2001):
log y = α + βS + γX + δX2 + θZ + ε (5.1)
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where yi is an individuals income, Si is the number of years of completed education,
Xi is the number of years an individual has worked since completing his education
(which is a proxy for experience), Z is a vector of other possibly related variables (for
instance sex or marital status), θ is a vector of parameters for individual variables
from Z, εi is the residual and α, ..., δ are the appropriate coefficients in the regressions
(out of these the coefficient β we call “the returns to education”).
As the income variable, we have the opportunity to choose between the ratio of
the net income per year and the number of workhours per week, or net income per
year. While net income per year grows with both the average wage (per hour) and
the workload, the ratio controls for the different amount of time spent at work (the
number of working weeks per year is the same for nearly every profession). It has
been established, that higher average income per hour represents more than 2/3
Card (1999) of the returns to education (see the same source for further discussion).
Thus, the ratio of annual income and workweeks would theoretically be a better
dependent variable.
However, in SILC there is a large amount of missing observations for the number
of workhours per week (the Workedweekly variable), and so I will rather use just
the net income. A good point is also brought up in Ashenfelter and Ham (1979)
that the extra time spent working thanks to higher education may either be caused
by a higher inclination to work caused by higher education (a growth in voluntary
amount of employment), or by being less in danger of not being able to find a job
(a reduction in involuntary unemployment).
As I will return to it later, I also mention the extended Mincer function which
includes the effect of receiving a certificate. It is in the form of
log y = α + βS + γX + δX2 + θZ + ζC + ε, (5.2)
Ferrer and Riddell (2001) identical to (5.1), except for the vector C representing
dummy variables for individual earned credentials and the vector ζ representing
parameters the for the individual certificates. We will return to this second function
shortly. Now let us proceed to the regressions themselves. We shall start with the
SILC dataset, then replicate all the steps for the SES dataset.
5.3 The Regressions
Firstly we examine the standing of the weaker proposed hypothesis. Because we
are interested in the returns to an extra year of grade school education while the
elementary school certificate remains present with all individuals, we will use equa-
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tion (5.1)6. As the vector Z I introduced a set of dummy variables: Sex, MStatus,
Prague (life in Prague is associated with significantly higher income), and a vector
of dummies for years of SILC origin Collected. We compare these dummies to the
estimated value of the intercept α which stands for the returns of a single male not
living in Prague on whom data was collected in 2009.
We start with running a usual OLS regression in the form 5.3 for three cohorts
before and after the cut-off point
log Income = α + βEducYrs + γWorkedyrs
+ δWorkedyrs2 + θ1Sex+θ2MStatus
+ θ3Collected + θ4Prague + ε. (5.3)
and we specify the model by removing the least significant variables as long as
this raises the Adjusted R-square, while staying in the form of the model proposed
by the Mincer equation. This leads to very slightly different models for both cases.
However, after testing for the assumptions of the OLS model7 , I discovered that the
residual homoskedasticity does not hold, that the residuals are not from the normal
distribution, and that the data is on the verge of being multicollinear. For this reason
I applied the robust regression8, which is less dependent on met assumptions, in the
form (5.3), and again specified the model, this time using R-square 9. Even though
the coefficients themselves vary between the OLS and robust estimates, the trend is
the same in both cases, which is a good sign (Kennedy, 2001).
To be able to compare the results before and after the cut-off, I now multiply the
data from before the cut-off point with the dummy Eighth and the data after with a
dummy variable Ninth. These dummies represent the sides of the cutoff point which
had the respective length of education. (Throughout the text, I will denote other
variables multiplied by these dummies by an E or an N at their end, for instance
EducYrsE for a variable denoting the total number of schooling years of those who
did not have a ninth grade.)
I then ran an OLS regression, and after testing for the assumptions and finding
6According to Card (1999) it is also possible to use the cubic and quartic transformations of the
“experience” proxy. I tried it and the corresponding coefficients were not significant at the one
percent level, so I use only the quadratic transformation.
7I test for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan, Cook-Weiseberg, and White’s tests, for
normality using the Shapiro-Wilk, Shapiro-Francia, and Skewness-Curtosis tests, and for mul-
ticollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factors.
8The violation of the assumption of homoskedasticity in classical OLS means that the vector of
estimates is not Best (it does not have the lowest possible variance), non-normal distribution
of residuals means we cannot use t-tests and F-tests reliably, and multicollinearity also causes
high variance. (Kennedy, 2001)
9A “measure of fit” for robust regression is not a default part of Stata, so we use the rregfit
plug-in by Ender and Chen, UCLA. I specify models according to these criteria also in future
regressions, with no significant differences.
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out that the OLS conditions are not met, I ran also the robust regression. The
results I got were very different from those of the OLS regression. For cohorts
around 39, I cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of returns to education at
a 30% level of significance between both sides of the cutoff point (with a p-value
of 0.322). For those around 70, the coefficients are less than half those of OLS,
but they are significantly different at the 1% level, and they are lower in case of a
presence of the ninth grade (estimate of 0.019 with a standard error of 0.001 and
an estimate 0.024 with a standard error of 0.001 for those with and without a ninth
grade, respectively). The R-squared of the regressions was between 0.3 and 0.4 in
both cases, the standard in similar studies. As in one case the returns did not grow
with the shortening of education, and in the second they did not, our results are
inconclusive. The results for 39 disagree with the weaker proposed hypothesis, while
those for case 70 agree with it. Further examination is needed.
Before I continue, I must mention another important result from these regressions.
The dummies Collected are always significant and they have a negative coefficient
- the earlier the observations of income, the higher the magnitude of the effect.
This is unsurprising, if for no other reason than for annual inflation. To make
sure that the year of observations has no effect, I run the regressions also for each
year independently. These regressions, made on a lower number of observations
and with a lower coefficient of determination, show the same trends as the previous
regressions, and so I will not discuss them further. This softens one of the concerns
I had about the usage of data that I mentioned before.
Next I shall do the same regressions as before, but this time I will not look for
the significance of the change in law using the change in the returns to education
coefficient, but I will test for the significance of the Ninth dummy variable itself. It
would be tempting to compare the coefficient of Ninth to the EducYrs coefficient
and expect them to be similar, as both provide an extra year of education. However,
both of these variables are also very different in nature. As the years of education
were imputed without differentiation, the coefficient for EducYrs represents an extra
year of “any” education. On the other hand, the coefficient for Ninth represents an
extra year of lower secondary education (because it is a separate dummy), but it
will also capture any other effects which happened over the same time period. The
regression will have the form (5.4)
log Income = α + βEducYrs + γWorkedyrs
+ δWorkedyrs2 + θ1Sex+θ2MStatus
+ θ3Collected + θ4Prague + λNinth + ε. (5.4)
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After running the regressions I got results which were in trend similar to the those
before. The coefficient λ is not too significant (p-value of 0.0613) for 39, and it is
significant for 70 (p-value close to zero), and in both cases it is negative (λ39 =
−0.021 and λ70 = −0.024 with standard errors 0.011 and 0.004, respectively).10
From these results, it seems that an extra year of education had a negative impact
on the earnings of the individuals.
The negative results of the dummy variable Ninth are somewhat puzzling. If the
extra grade had no effect, I would expect it not to be significant, if it had a positive
impact, the message would be clear - more school means higher returns. However,
the fact that an extra year reduces the amount of money an individual makes is
surprising. We could interpret the results as meaning that the pupil loses some of
his or her skills because of an extra year in school during which not much happens,
but this does not seem likely.
The result is even more non-intuitive taking in account I have data on experi-
ence, which means I can discard the explanation that an extra year of education
is equivalent to a year less of experience. I could also try to explain the effect by
saying that my model underestimated the role of career growth. However, because
both the reforms for those around 39 and around 70 meant that the ninth grade was
canceled, it also means that those who did have it are older, and in the case of those
around 39 they should have higher income. The fact that the coefficient is negative
is again contrary to this interpretation.
As these results do not seem reasonable, they are quite hard to interpret. It is
possible that the effect I tried to find is too small to be found by this model, or
it is possibly outweighed by other factors for which the model does not account
(or both). This in effect means that the assumption of the regression discontinuity
design (cohorts before and after almost identical) does not hold. It seems that
something is amiss. To find out what, I alter my model, and try examining the
problem from a different perspective.
5.4 The Altered Mincer Function
The following method is loosely based on the extended Mincer equation (5.2). This
time, I use dummy variables to estimate the coefficients independently for each
level of highest attained education (Educ), and ignore the number of years that
an individual has spent in school. Firstly, I use the same dummy variable Ninth as
before, the significance of which determines the impact of another year of education
10To estimate the effect of dummy variables we must use the formula ĝ = exp η− 1, where ĝis the
estimated growth of loged income, as explained for instance in Baltagi (2008), but for negative
values this does not, understandably, change the estimated effect’s sign. Nor is this relevant
when comparing the values of the dummy variables.
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on the individual. Then I will compare the coefficients for the certificate in cases
when an individual had a ninth grade and did not have a ninth grade. Both of these
approaches are analogous to the ones from the previous section, their difference is
in the way education is represented. The regression is in the form (5.5)
ln Income = α + γWorkedYrs + δWorkedYrs2
+ θ1Sex + θ2MStatus + θ3Collected
+ θ4PRAGUE +ζEduc+λNinth+ε. (5.5)
where the coefficient α represents the estimated returns for a single male, who does
not live in Prague, who underwent eight year primary and secondary education, and
who took part in the SILC 2009 data collection, and the various dummies represent
the deviation from this setting. Since the conditions for an OLS regression are again
not met, I used the robust regression11, and got the following results for Case 39
and Case 70, which are similar to the previous model. That the dummy Ninth is
not zero cannot be rejected at the one percent level (but it can be rejected at the
five percent level with a p-value of 0.044) in case of those around 39, but in the case
of the cohorts around 70m Ninth is significant (p-value close to zero) and negative
(λ = −0.023). I also tested whether the Ninth coefficient is significantly different if
we include the interaction effects, and in both cases it is negative and significant.
Now we can compare the results of returns to education for each level of education
attained. Here we use dummy variables with interaction effects, as noted for instance
in Kennedy (2001). This means I multiplied all the other variables with the Ninth
and Eighth dummy variables to get, for instance, EducationN for having both
Ninth and a certain level of education. The regression had the form (5.6)
ln Income = α + γnWorkedYrsN + γeWorkedYrsE + δnWorkedYrs2N
+ δeWorkedYrs2E + θ1nSexN + θ1eSexE + θ2nMStatusN
+ θ2eMStatusE + θ3nCollectedN+θ3eCollectedE+θ4nPRAGUEN
+ θ4ePRAGUEE +ζnEducationN+ζeEducationE + ε. (5.6)
I then tested whether there are significant differences between the EducationN and
EducationE coefficients. In general, the differences were not significant. For those
around 39, we cannot reject the hypothesis of coefficient equality at the 5% level
of significance in all cases, for those around 70 in all but two, and in the two we
cannot reject one at the 1% level of significance (p-value = 0.031) in one case, in
11Because the OLS conditions are never met for this model, from now on I shall always use the
robust regression.
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the second one we can (p-value = 0.002), and the coefficient values of this case are
0.171 (0.014) with ninth grade, 0.230 (0.013) without. It seems that the returns to
educational certificates do not change too much with a change in length by one year
during primary or lower secondary education.
To sum up this approach, we have discovered two things. Firstly, the Ninth
dummy variable truly tends to be negative, no matter the model we use. Secondly,
the differences between the returns to the certificates themselves are largely negli-
gible, and if there are some, they tend to correspond with the effect of the Ninth
dummy: longer overall education means lower returns. As these are surprising
results, it is necessary to check whether they are not caused by some underlying
problem in the model rather than by the relationship we are trying to model itself.
5.5 Confounding variables
Even though my coefficient of determination is in a reasonable range for all the
regressions I did, above 0.3, which is a reasonable social science threshold, it is
obvious that there is still much scope for further explanatory variables. To test
whether I have overlooked any significant explanatory variable which could have
been correlated with both my explanatory and my dependent variable (a so-called
confounding variable) I perform the regressions again, but this time on periods where
“nothing happened”, i.e. no changes in law took place. Then I determine whether I
still get results different for the period before and after the cutoff point, and compare
the magnitudes of the effects.
To be able to do this, I need to choose periods when nothing happened and where
at the same time I can have three years of cohorts in both directions available for the
regressions. That means I need a period of at least seven years with no educational
reforms. There are only two such periods: from 1961 to 1983, and from 1985 to
1996. However, the second of these periods is interrupted in two ways, firstly by the
change in the mandatory length of education in 1990, and secondly by the Velvet
Revolution itself. For this reason I chose only the first period. These years represent
the SILC 2009 cohorts between 40 and 61 (as can be seen in Table 7 on page 25),
and for the cohorts between 43 and 58 we run the same regressions (I shall call
these empty regressions) as we did in the last two sections (using the specific cohort
as the cut-off point). In each case we drop the middle cohort and use the three
previous and three following cohorts as the groups “before” and “after” the change.
As both cases we examined dealt with canceling the ninth grade, I will model the
same situation with the cohort “before” having a ninth grade, and the cohort “after”
not having it.
After running 16 (robust) regressions in the form (5.3), one for each year, I received
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the coefficients for education before and after the imaginary cutoff points. I assume
that if the model I am using is good in predicting the dependent variable, the
coefficients should be the same on both sides of the cutoff point, as the only difference
in the model is a dummy with no “content” (it does not correspond to any changes
in the structure of the microdata). However, outside the model, having the “no
content” dummy is associated with being after the cutoff point, which means being
2 - 6 years older than those at the other side of the cutoff point. During this period,
changes, which are not captured by the explanatory variables in my model, may
have occurred.
I tested the equality of coefficients before and after the cutoff points, and in 9
cases out of 16 I was not able to reject the hypothesis of the equality of coefficients
at the 10 percent level of significance, while in seven cases the results were signif-
icantly different, and out of that five times at 1 percent level of significance. The
interesting fact about this result is the distribution of the positive and negative ef-
fects. For the cohorts 43-46 the differences are insignificant, for 47 to 49 they are
significant and positive (being from an older cohort means getting more from your
education) for the 50 cohort they are insignificant, for 51 and 52 significant and
negative (being from an older cohort means getting less from your education), for
53 to 56 insignificant and for 57 and 58 significant and negative. This corresponds
with the results which we got for the cohorts where education changes actually hap-
pened: insignificant changes for those around 39, significant and negative changes
for those around 70. An interesting aspect of this distribution is also the fact that
the average returns for before and after the cutoff points, which may be used as a
rough approximation of the usual returns, are the same for both groups, 0.0930 and
0.0929 respectively. For numerical values see table Confounding Variables, returns,
for a graphical representation figure Returns to Education, confounding
Before further interpretation, I will replicate also the other regressions. Firstly
the significance of the dummy Ninth using imputed years. While in the previous
cases with a real cutoff point we expected Ninth to be significant, because it was
related to an extra year of education, this time we added a dummy Ninth for the
three cohorts before the cutoff point (ages one, two, and three years higher than the
cohort for which the cutoff happened). As in the previous case: if my model covers
all the effects, we would expect Ninth to be insignificant. However, that is not the
case: the coefficient Ninth is significant in all the regressions at 1 percent level, and
has a negative coefficient (see table Confounding Variables, returns), which are the
results I have already obtained before, and which were very non-intuitive.
As we can see, the negative coefficients are significantly larger than the ones we
obtained from our regressions before. This is an important fact, as it implies that
the net effect of a Ninth when an educational reform happened should be positive.
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It seems, that the coefficients for Ninth was actually composed of two parts - a
coefficient for Before ( the one we have just identified by running the regression with
nothing happening), and a true coefficient NinthTrue, which represents the impact
that the ninth grade had on the individual.
To finish this simulation, I also run the regression using dummy variables for
individual certificate levels, and again test for the significance of Ninth, similarly as
in the section The Altered Mincer Function. All the Ninth coefficients are significant
at the 1% level and negative. Then we compare the returns to highest achieved
education for individual cases. The differences are more often insignificant than
not, the same as before. Out of the 102 tested relationships (16 regressions, 7 tests
per regression) in 67 cases we cannot refuse the hypothesis that the coefficients are
the same at the 5 percent level of significance, in 35 cases we are able to do so. The
results are summed up in table 8.
The regressions for the cohorts, which have not undergone any educational re-
forms, have shown us that there probably are present confounding variables, which
bias my results from the previous regressions. However, knowing the magnitude of
these effects allows me to compensate for them. I shall discuss what sense can be
made of the coefficient I have in Results. However, before I do so, I will replicate the
just described regressions on a larger data set: the Structure of Earnings Survey.
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43 .085 (.003) .081 (.004) No.
(p-value= 0.373)
-.066 (0.12) -.072 (.011)
44 .085 (.003) .085 (.003) No.
(p-value= 0.921)
-.044 (.011) -.047 (.011)
45 .085 (.003) .087 (.003) No.
(p-value= 0.583)
-.050. (.011) -.046 (.011)
46 .094 (.003) .093 (.003) No.
(p-value= 0.678)
-.059 (.011) -.054 (.011)
47 .102 (.003) .087 (.003) Yes. ↑
(p-value=0.0)
-.075 (.011) -.074 (.011)
48 .105 (.003) .086 (.003) Yes. ↑
(p-value=0.0)
-.081 (.011) -.084 (.010)
49 .099 (.003) .087 (.003) Yes. ↑
(p-value= 0.001)
-.074 (.011) -.082 (.010)
50 .091 (.003) .097 (.003) No.
(p-value=0.138)
-.059 (.011) -.067 (.010)
51 .095 (.003) .104 (.003) Yes. ↓
(p-value=0.014)
-.085 (.011) -.090 (.010)
52 .095 (.003) .106 (.003) Yes. ↓
(p-value=0.003)
-.108 (.010) -.111 (.010)
53 .099 (.003) .10 (.003) No.
(p-value=0.765 )
-.139 (.010) -.135 (.009)
54 .097 (.003) .091 (.003) No.
(p-value=0.13 )
-.159 (.010) -.151 (.009)
55 .095 (.003) .095 (.003) No.
(p-value=0.89 )
-.165 (.010) -.158 (.009)
56 .091 (.003) .096 (.003) No.
(p-value=0.179 )
-.165 (.009) -.159 (.009)
57 .085 (.003) .098 (.003) Yes. ↓
(p-value=0.0)
-.156 (.009) -.159 (.009)
58 .085 (.003) .094 (.003) Yes. ↓
(p-value=0.009)
-.154 (.009) -.160 (.009)
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5.6 Regressing on Structure of Earning Survey data
The Structure of Earning Survey has already been discussed in the section House-
hold Data. I shall just point out that as it is a data set consisting of microdata
for employees of companies, all the respondents are below the retirement age, and
thus all the run regressions are for the cohorts around those who were 39 in 2009.
Furthermore, I ran all the regressions in two variants, one with hourly wage and
one with quarterly wage, which takes into account the growth in the amount of time
spent working, but, as the results are similar in trend, I shall list them only for hwage
most of the time. Finally, as I do not have a variable “number of worked years”, I
must use age instead. The most important implication of this is that the returns
I get from education are actually the returns from education net of the returns of
an extra year of experience. As I did not have direct access to the data12, which
means I had to use the methodology just explained, I will describe these results
comparatively in brief.
Firstly, I ran the regression in form (5.7) (analogous to (5.6)) to test the equality
of coefficients for educational certificates Education
ln hwage = α + γnAgeN + γeAgeE + δnAge2N
+ δeAge2E + ζnEducationN + ζeEducationE + ε (5.7)
where the results were similar as in the previous case. Out of the eight compared
coefficients, only in one case were they significantly (at the 5% level) different. If
we compare this to the results of empty regressions, we find that it is very similar.
Usually we are not able to reject the hypothesis of coefficient equality, with the
exception of an occasional pair of coefficients.
Next, we shall impute the years of education, and compare the coefficients of the
variable EducYrs. We use a regression in the form (5.8)
ln hwage = α + γnAgeN + γeAgeE + δnAge2N
+ δeAge2E + ζnEducYrsN + ζeEducYrsE + ε (5.8)
and receive the returns ζn = 0.054 and ζe = 0.1, both with a standard error close
to zero. We can reject the equality of these coefficients at the one percent level of
significance, and we can see that the coefficient has declined with the presence of
the ninth grade. This would seem to comply with the weaker hypothesis proposed
earlier. However, it is still necessary to compare this result to the results of the empty
12Remote data access was generously granted by Stepan Jurajda.
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regressions. After examining them we see that 14 out of the 16 pairs of coefficients
had significant differences, all of them in the same direction as in our regression.
However, the magnitude differs. The average values of the empty regression are
ζne = 0.091 and ζee = 0.087, which is a significantly smaller difference (taking into
account the miniscule standard errors) than the one we have received. Thus, we can
conclude that we have really received results which agree with our weaker hypothesis:
an extra year of education provides smaller returns than the previous ones.
Finally, we can deal with the question of the significance of the dummy Ninth.
As previously, we shall do so by running regressions in the forms (5.9).
ln hwage = α + γAge + δAge2+ζEducation+λdNinth+ε
and (5.9)
ln hwage = α + γAge + δAge2 + ζEducYrs + λiNinth + ε
In both cases we received similar results, that is λd = 0.009 and λi = 0.01 with
standard errors 0.004 and 0.000 and p-values of 0.055 and 0.000 for the case with
dummies for highest educational certificate and imputed years of education, respec-
tively. Comparison with the empty regression show that these results seem fairly
usual, because in 11 out of the 16 cases when we test for significance of Ninth in
the imputed cases and in 10 out of the 16 in the dummy variable cases we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that λi = 0 and λd = 0, respectively, at the five percent
level of significance. That is similar to our current case, in which in one case the
result is significant, and in the other is not. The general insignificance also manifests
itself in the average values of λi and λd for the empty regressions, which are both
0.000. If this would be the result of educational legislature changes, rather than
some unspecified fluctuation in the data, I would more expect the dummies to be
significant in both cases, similarly as when we used SILC. Thus, I interpret these
results for ninth as not indicating any change caused by the canceling of the ninth
grade.
To sum up the results, using the Structure of Earning Survey data I was not able
to find any impact of a ninth grade on the coefficients for highest attained education,
which corresponds with the results using SILC. The comparison of returns to a year
of education is more intriguing, leading to clearer results than in the SILC cases by
finding a decline in the returns to a year of education related to the presence of ninth
grade where the previous analysis provided uncertain results. As the main problem
of the SILC regression was the lack of the discerning capabilities of the model used
and the small data sample, I think it is likely that this result has improved on the
previous estimates, finding a relationship before not clearly shown. Finally, we found
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Ninth to not be significant when compared to the trend for the empty regressions.
Having said this, it is important to recapitulate that difference between using
SILC and SES. The difference in results may be also caused by using the explanatory
variable age instead of worked years. Definitely, any coefficients received from the
SES study should be taken as somewhat higher when compared with the SILC
results, as their coefficients are actually net of an extra year of experience. This




To make the orientation in the results I have obtained simpler, I shall tabulate
them depending on the methods used for attaining them. I shall then interpret
the differences that have come up throughout the thesis as a result of different
regressions. The methods I have used can be split into the following groups:
• Regressions using EducYrs (recoded differently for cases with and without
ninth grade), and then testing for equality of the returns to a year of education.
• Regressions using EducYrs (recoded in the same way for all cases), and then
testing the extra dummy Ninth for significance.
• Regressions using dummies for each level of Education, and then testing the
extra dummy Ninth for significance.
• Regressions using dummies for each level of Education, and then applying the
test of equality to the returns to certificates for each level of certificates.
and furthermore,
• Empty regression for the cohorts 43 to 58, which did not experience any
changes in law, and which I used to estimate the effect of variables left out
from my model (most importantly those related to the passing of time). For
illustration, I report the average values for returns to a year of education, the
overall trends in their differences, and the average values of the coefficient for
Ninth.
All of these regressions were run on both the SILC and SES datasets. Aside from
the regressions in table Results I also ran the regressions for individual years of
data collection (in case of SILC) and for the alternative financial explanatory vari-
ables. These did not have any important impact on my results, and so I do not list
them. Otherwise the table contains estimate values, standard deviations (in brack-
ets), significance levels, and ↓↑ symbols showing in which direction the coefficient
changed with the presence of the ninth grade. In the case of returns to certificates,
the reported coefficients are for the highest certificates attained by the individual
(shortest vocational education to Ph.D), and the column Difference compares the
previous two columns.
Firstly, I shall mention the regressions using dummies for each level of Education,
and then compare their results. As these differences were largely insignificant among
the cohorts where legislative changes occurred (12 to 2 in SILC, 7 to 1 in SES), and
there was some variation among the empty regressions with more differences being





































































































.087 / .01 .091 / .105 2 No, 14 Yes.
↓
.000/.000 .000/.000
no relevant change in the returns to certificates after the occurrence of legislative
changes. Because of the amount of numerical values involved, I do not report these
results in the table. In the context of the stronger hypotheses stated in the beginning,
this result complies - lengthening of education causes no changes in the returns to the
certificate. The reliability of these results is strengthened by the fact that they hold
for both the SILC and the SES datasets. As has been discussed in the beginning,
the stronger hypothesis implies the weaker one, which again fits with our results,
see bellow.
Now let us discuss the table. The first thing worth noticing is that the SILC
returns to a year for those around 39 are reasonably close to the returns for the
years where nothing happened (the closest cohort to 39 with an empty regression,
43, has returns equal to 0.085, and 0.81, see table Confounding Variables, returns),
while the returns for those around 70 are much lower. This is unsurprising, because
the pensions are only weakly income dependent, and thus the returns will under-
standably be significantly lower than the average for working individuals. Secondly,
we see that in the SILC regression we were not able to find a significant difference
in the returns to a year of education. However, there remains the fact of a signifi-
cant negative change in the returns to a year of education for the cohort around 70
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related to having gone through a ninth grade.
The question is the more interesting, if we take into account that the income
from the pensions does not change with age (except for valorization with inflation),
and so the returns should represent the incomes for the several last years of the
productive life on both sides of the cutoff. One possible but false explanation is
that the inequality of the cohorts on the different sides of the cutoff point is caused
by a different number of working and retired individuals. However, as the average
retirement age in the Czech Republic is under 61 years (Eurostat, 2011), and after
examination of the data I found a negligibly larger number of individuals with at
least a part-time job in the younger cohorts (a difference of 60 on a data set of more
than 5,500 observations), we can be fairly certain that the cohorts are similar in this
aspect. Thus, I can safely eliminate this explanation.
Another possible explanation is to argue that this negative change is only a fluctu-
ation similar to the ones that occur among the empty regressions for non-educational
reform reasons, and still cause significant differences in the estimates. However, re-
gression on the SES data shows us that the reduction in the returns to a year of
education also holds there. I consider these two regression on two different datasets
to be sufficient evidence for concluding that we cannot reject our weaker hypothesis,
the hypothesis of a reduction in returns to a year of education related to an extra
experienced year of education. In other words, we have found diminishing returns
to years of education. This makes sense, because since we were not able to reject
the stronger hypothesis, it would be strange if we were able to reject the weaker one.
Finally, there is the question of the coefficients of the independent dummies Ninth.
In SILC, which we shall discuss first, we have two sets of these results, which are very
similar, and in both cases significant. However, because of their dummy variable
nature they are also more likely to include effects not related to the educational
reforms.
For SILC, the results show a significant difference in coefficients for Ninth be-
tween the empty regressions and the regressions with a change in law. It is worth
mentioning that the average values of the empty regressions do not provide all the
needed information here. The negative impact of Ninth had a trend in the empty
regressions, beginning at roughly -0.06 for the cohorts after 43, and ending at -0.16
for the cohorts before 58. In both cases the difference between the empty regressions
and the regressions with a cohort influenced by education reform is very large, for
those around 58 and 70 even more so. The result is the same when comparing the
dummies gained from the empty regressions using Education dummies (the coeffi-
cient starts at -0.07 and ends at -0.16). To see the trend and magnitude in detail,
see table Table 8 on page 34, and figure Coefficients of Ninth.
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The interpretation I would propose here is the one I have already implied earlier.
The fact that Ninth has a negative coefficient independent of the occurrence of any
educational reform means that there is a negative trend in the model I use when
being applied to the SILC data. We could expect the explanation of this trend to
be connected to the different structure of cohorts caused by the different ages of the
individuals of which they consist. Nevertheless, its nature is not that important.
As the presence of Ninth when educational reforms occurred had a significantly
smaller negative coefficient than in other periods, I would assume that ninth grade
as such had a positive effect on the returns to education, but this effect is masked
by the trend which makes the coefficient of Ninth negative. These results would
then indicate that the change in the length of education did actually have a certain
positive impact on the incomes of the individuals. We could make an extremely
rough estimate of the value of the NinthTrue coefficient as the difference between
the average return to the empty regressions and the regression coefficient we have
gained, which gives us approximately 0.079.
Furthermore, the question still remains as to how these results comply with the
results for the dummy Ninth used on the SES dataset. It must be noted that there
is quite some uncertainty concerning these results, and I am not able to provide a
clear-cut answer. As in one case the result is significant and in the same direction as
when using SILC, and in the second it is insignificant, I think a clear interpretation
of these results is not possible. An explanation for the observed differences could be
for instance the usage of the variable age instead of the variable worked years in the
SES regressions, which in effect reduces the coefficients that we have received from
SES, and thus makes the comparison between the models more difficult.
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Furthermore, there is uncertainty concerning the relationships with the previously
received results - the results from a positive coefficient for Ninth imply that there
should be at least some minor positive returns to a certificate of education, while the
comparison of returns to certificates implied none. Further conciliation of these two
sets of results requires inquiry above the scope of this thesis. The final conclusion
we can make on this topic is that the returns to an educational certificate seem to
be non-existent to very small and positive.
Finally, I would like to stress a point made in the beginning of my thesis, and that
is that we cannot be sure to what extent the effect we have measured is caused by
longer mandatory education and to which by the longer time spent in basic school
because of its extension.
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7 Conclusion
In my thesis I tried to discover what impact an extra year of education has on
the incomes of individuals. To do this, I compared individuals who went through
different lengths of primary and lower secondary education. I was able to do this by
cohorts thanks to a natural experiment caused by legislative changes during (except
one instance in 1996) the period of socialist rule in Czechoslovakia, which on several
occasions changed the length of primary and lower secondary education from nine
years to eight, or from eight years to nine.
I examined these occurrences on two datasets - the SILC (Statistics on Income and
Living Conditions) and the SES (Structure of Earning Survey) - and along several
lines. The first dividing line was the year in which the legislative change took place:
I examined the cohorts which experienced the change in 1984 and those in 1953 (in
both cases a reduction of length from nine years to eight years), i.e. those, who were
39 and 70 in 2009, respectively. Next, the regression I used depended on whether
I chose imputed years of education, or dummy variables for the highest attained
educational certificate. Finally, the methods differ in what I examined - whether the
equality of educational coefficients for the cohorts between and after the educational
change, or the significance of a dummy variable representing the presence of a ninth
grade of education. To sum this up, I examined the following: equality of coefficients
for years of education using imputed years of education, equality of coefficients
for highest attained educational certificates using dummies for the highest level of
education, and the significance of a dummy variable representing an extra year of
education using first imputed years, then dummies for highest certificate.
To control for variables not included in my model I also ran comparison regressions
on cohorts, which were not influenced by a legislative change, and then compared
those results with the original results for the cohorts, which were influenced. I
interpret the net received effect as a result of the change in the length of education.
My aim was to examine two aspects of the change in educational length, each
related to a different form of the regression used. These were the changes in the
returns to a certificate of education and the changes in the returns to an extra year
of education. My results are that I was not able to find any changes in the returns
to the certificate using the comparison of the certificates, and I was able to find a
very small and positive change to the returns by using a regression with a dummy
variable representing the presence of the ninth grade. The impact of an extra year
of education on the returns to the average years of education was negative, which
is intuitive, as it corresponds with the law of diminishing returns, and is implied by
the presence of no (or very small) positive change in the returns to a certificate.
At the end of my thesis I would also like to mention possible ways in which
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the natural experiment with which I have worked with could be further utilized in
economics research. I have chosen this topic for my thesis because I consider this
historical period to be under-examined, and I believe that the information provided
by these reforms has not yet been used to its full potential. There is still work to
be done!
Firstly, I think the estimates I have made could be improved by using more data.
The biggest source of such data would be the Slovak Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions, which I have regretfully not been able to obtain. Secondly, I did not
use the last cutoff year in 1996, because those who have undergone the reform have
not yet been on the labor market long enough for their returns to education to
differentiate sufficiently. However, in a few year’s time the data will be ready for
an analysis of this change, and as this change was very sharp and also the most
recent, meaning the best data is available, I believe this will be a huge opportunity
to better examine the effect that an extra year of education had.
Also, if one would have direct access to a larger dataset (such as the Structure
of Earnings Survey) modeling of the returns to education for successive cohorts,
and transferring the problem analyzed in my thesis into the domain of time series
analysis, could provide further insights on the behavior of the returns to education.
Regrettably, applying this method on a smaller dataset is unlikely to provide results
because of the amount of noise in the data.
But why restrict the question to income? There are more aspects of life of the
society that could be included, and which did not fit into the scope of this thesis.
One obvious possibility would be to examine the impact of leaving school a year early
on the number of children an individual has. This research would also have several
upsides, one of them being that the number of children per female is not influenced
by higher age after the beginning of menopause, which simplifies comparisons for
different cohorts. And for older cohorts, there is even a dataset offering precisely
this type of data: SHARE, the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe.
The last direction of research based on these changes in law that I would like to
propose is the impact on employment. Even though the relationship between edu-
cation and employment is not that strong - over education being a serious problem
- I think it would be worth examining, if there might be any link connecting the
two, because reduced unemployment would be a great result of an extra year of
education. Inspiration could be gained for instance from Nickell (1979). However,
the data source is the problem - SILC does not provide enough observations for
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